When resistance is useless: Policing and the evolution of reproductive acquiescence in insect societies by Hart, Adam G et al.
This is a peer­reviewed, final published version of the following document, Educational use only. and is 
licensed under All Rights Reserved license:
Hart, Adam G ORCID: 0000­0002­4795­9986, Ratnieks, F.L.W. and 
Wenseleers, T. (2004) When resistance is useless: Policing and the 
evolution of reproductive acquiescence in insect societies. American 
Naturalist, 164 (6). pp. 154­167. ISSN 1537­5323 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/425223
EPrint URI: http://eprints.glos.ac.uk/id/eprint/226
Disclaimer 
The University of Gloucestershire has obtained warranties from all depositors as to their title in the material 
deposited and as to their right to deposit such material.  
The University of Gloucestershire makes no representation or warranties of commercial utility, title, or fitness 
for a particular purpose or any other warranty, express or implied in respect of any material deposited.  
The University of Gloucestershire makes no representation that the use of the materials will not infringe any 
patent, copyright, trademark or other property or proprietary rights.  
The University of Gloucestershire accepts no liability for any infringement of intellectual property rights in any 
material deposited but will remove such material from public view pending investigation in the event of an 
allegation of any such infringement. 
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR TEXT.
vol. 164, no. 6 the american naturalist december 2004 
E-Article
When Resistance Is Useless: Policing and the Evolution of
Reproductive Acquiescence in Insect Societies
Tom Wenseleers,1,* Adam G. Hart,2,† and Francis L. W. Ratnieks2,‡
1. Laboratory of Entomology, Zoological Institute, University of
Leuven, Naamsestraat 59, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium;
2. Laboratory of Apiculture and Social Insects, Department of
Animal and Plant Sciences, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S10
2TN, United Kingdom
Submitted March 18, 2004; Accepted August 12, 2004;
Electronically published November 9, 2004
Online enhancements: Mathematica notebook and code.
abstract: In social groups composed of kin, inclusive fitness ben-
efits can favor greater cooperation. Alternatively, cooperation can be
enforced through the policing of less cooperative individuals. Here,
we show that the effect of policing can be twofold: not only can it
directly suppress individual selfishness, it can also entirely remove
the incentive for individuals to act selfishly in the first place. We
term such individual restraint in response to socially imposed po-
licing “acquiescence” and illustrate the concept using examples drawn
from the social Hymenoptera (the ants, bees, and wasps). Inclusive
fitness models confirm that when a policing system is in place, in-
dividuals should be less tempted to act selfishly. This is shown to
have important consequences for the resolution of conflict within
their societies. For example, it can explain why in many species very
few workers attempt to reproduce and why immature females usually
do not attempt to develop as queens rather than workers. Although
our analyses are primarily focused on the social insects, our conclu-
sions are likely to be general and to apply to other societies as well.
Keywords: social policing, altruism, acquiescence, social insects,
worker reproduction, caste conflict.
Nonclonal individuals within social groups frequently have
dissimilar reproductive interests, leading to conflict (Rat-
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nieks and Reeve 1992; Hamilton 1995; Frank 1998; Keller
1999). Conflicts of interest can arise at all levels of social
organization, from intragenomic and intercell lineage con-
flicts within organisms (Hurst et al. 1996; Michod 1999;
Pomiankowski 1999) to parent-offspring and interindi-
vidual conflicts in families and societies (Trivers 1974; Triv-
ers and Hare 1976; Hamilton 1995; Queller and Strass-
mann 1998). In social groups, where all individuals are
affected to a greater or lesser extent by the behavior of
others, conflict is usually detrimental because individuals
who serve their own selfish interests reduce group pro-
ductivity (Hardin 1968; Frank 1995; Heckathorn 1996).
However, conflict-induced social collapse is not inevitable
because conflicts are often absent or else efficiently re-
solved (Ratnieks and Reeve 1992).
One situation where conflicts are reduced occurs in
groups composed of kin. Greater genetic relatedness be-
tween group members increases their similarity of inter-
ests, thereby reducing the potential for conflict (“kin se-
lection”; Hamilton 1964, 1995; Maynard Smith 1964;
Frank 1998). Social policing, whereby group members mu-
tually suppress each other’s selfish tendencies, is another
important mechanism that can resolve conflict (Ratnieks
1988; Frank 1995, 1996, 2003). Policing is usually envis-
aged as some coercive behavior that directly represses in-
dividual selfishness (Leigh 1991; Frank 1995, 2003), for
example, individuals forcefully preventing the overuse of
common resources (Hardin 1968; Leigh 1991; Frank 1995;
Ostrom 1999; Ostrom et al. 1999). Additionally, policing
can also describe situations where selfish individuals are
prevented from being successful. For example, in insect
societies, workers often eat or “police” eggs laid by other
workers (fig. 1; Ratnieks 1988; Ratnieks and Visscher
1989). Egg eating does not prevent selfish workers from
laying more eggs, but it does prevent them from success-
fully reproducing, thereby maintaining the reproductive
monopoly of the queen (Ratnieks 1988; Ratnieks and
Visscher 1989).
The above examples emphasize the direct influence of
policing. However, policing could also play an additional
and important role in resolving conflicts by indirectly mak-
Figure 1: Two forms of social policing in the social Hymenoptera. a, Policing of worker-laid eggs in the honeybee Apis mellifera (Ratnieks and
Visscher 1989). b, Execution of a dwarf queen (left) that developed in a worker cell in the stingless bee Schwarziana quadripunctata (Ribeiro and
Alves 2001; Wenseleers et al. 2003, 2004b). See text for explanations. Photos by F. L. W. Ratnieks (a) and T. Wenseleers (b).
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ing it unprofitable for individuals to act selfishly. For ex-
ample, if eggs laid by workers are eaten, then this may
select against workers activating their ovaries in the first
place. We name this “acquiescence,” that is, a situation in
which individuals are selected to conform to social norms
and regulations that are enforced against transgressors.
Although the possibility that policing can indirectly reduce
selfishness and favor greater cooperation has been alluded
to several times (e.g., Ratnieks 1988; Visscher 1989; Rat-
nieks and Reeve 1992; Frank 2003), this idea has never
been analyzed formally. The aim of this article is to make
a formal analysis of acquiescence and to determine, for a
variety of scenarios, when individuals are better off if they
do not resist policing. Our analyses explicitly investigate
the two main types of policing in social insects, which are
also among the best-studied examples of policing in the
animal kingdom: policing of egg-laying by workers, that
is, the prevention of male production by workers (fig. 1;
Ratnieks 1988; Ratnieks and Visscher 1989; Foster and
Ratnieks 2000, 2001c), and caste-fate policing, that is, the
prevention of immature females from successfully devel-
oping into queens rather than workers (fig. 1; Bourke and
Ratnieks 1999; Wenseleers et al. 2003; Wenseleers and Rat-
nieks 2004). The details of each will be discussed below.
Although we focus on social insects, we argue that the
evolution of acquiescence within social systems is a general
process that can reduce conflict and promote cooperation
in many other social situations.
Methods
We use kin selection methods similar to those developed
by Frank (1998) to analyze the likelihood that acquiescence
can evolve in response to policing. However, unlike Frank
(1998) we take an inclusive fitness rather than a direct or
neighbor-modulated fitness perspective. Each of the anal-
yses has also been confirmed using allele frequency meth-
ods. (See the online edition of the American Naturalist for
the Mathematica notebook with kin selection models and
equivalent genetic models.) In all cases, the different mod-
eling methods give numerically identical results. It should
also be noted that in all models, policing is included as a
fixed parameter rather than being allowed to coevolve with
the level of intragroup selfishness (Frank 1995, 1998). This
is because the evolutionary basis for policing is well un-
derstood in each case and we are concerned only with how
the presence of policing per se influences the optimal level
of selfishness in the group. See table 1 for definitions of
model notation and parameters.
Results
Worker Sterility as Acquiescence
In the social Hymenoptera, male production is one of the
most important contexts in which conflict can arise. In
the majority of species, including most ants, Apis hon-
eybees, Meliponinae stingless bees, and Vespinae wasps,
workers retain ovaries even though they cannot mate (Wil-
son 1971; Bourke 1988). Through the haplodiploid sex
determination mechanism found in the Hymenoptera,
these workers can lay unfertilized, male-destined eggs and
thereby challenge the reproductive primacy of the queen.
From an inclusive fitness perspective, worker reproduction
is beneficial at the individual level (Hamilton 1964; Trivers
and Hare 1976), because any worker is more related to
her own sons ( ) than to her brothers, the queen’srp 0.5
sons ( ). However, if the queen mates multiplerp 0.25
times, as occurs, for example, in the honeybee (Palmer
and Oldroyd 2000), then workers are on average more
related to queen’s sons ( ) than to other workers’rp 0.25
sons (full- and half-nephews; ). This favors work-r ! 0.25
ers to selectively remove or “police” eggs laid by other
workers (fig. 1; Ratnieks 1988). Worker policing can also
be favored, even when paternity is below two, if it increases
colony efficiency (Ratnieks 1988) or if it allows the workers
to bias the sex ratio toward females (the worker optimum;
Trivers and Hare 1976) at low cost by the removal of males
in the egg stage (Foster and Ratnieks 2001b). The queen,
from her perspective, always favors the production of her
own sons ( ) over workers’ sons (her grandsons;rp 0.5
). Hence, the queen is also selected to eat worker-rp 0.25
laid eggs (queen policing; Trivers and Hare 1976; Ratnieks
1988) or to assist in worker policing by marking her eggs
with a specific signal (Ratnieks 1995).
Both queen and worker policing are widespread. Worker
policing via egg eating is known in several species each of
honeybees (fig. 1; Ratnieks and Visscher 1989; Halling et
al. 2001; Oldroyd et al. 2001), Vespinae wasps (reviewed
in Foster and Ratnieks 2001c), and ants (Kikuta and Tsuji
1999; D’Ettorre et al. 2004; Endler et al. 2004). Queen
policing by egg eating occurs in ants (Monnin and Peeters
1997; Kikuta and Tsuji 1999; Monnin et al. 2002), bum-
blebees (Free et al. 1969; Pomeroy 1979; Cnaani et al.
2002), Dolichovespula and Vespula rufa wasps (Greene
1979; Foster and Ratnieks 2001c; Wenseleers et al. 2005a,
2005b), Polistes paper wasps (Fletcher and Ross 1985;
Reeve 1991), and the halictid bee Lasioglossum zephyrum
(Michener and Brothers 1974).
Policing can be highly effective. For example, in the
honeybee, Apis mellifera, approximately 7% of all male
eggs are laid by workers (Visscher 1996), yet only 0.1%
of all adult males are worker derived (Visscher 1989). This
implies that approximately 99% of all worker-laid eggs are
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Table 1: Notation and parameters used in the models
Symbol Definition
Model in “Worker Sterility
as Acquiescence”:
n Colony size (number of workers)
Wf Total number of males produced by a focal worker in a colony
Wn Total number of males produced by each of the n  1 nestmate workers in the colony
Wmq Total number of males produced by the queen
Wq Total number of queens or swarms produced by the colony
x Probability with which a focal worker in a colony activates its ovaries
x ′ Probability with which each of the n1 nestmates activates its ovaries
x¯ Colony average probability with which workers activates its ovaries p (1  n)x  [(n  1)/
n]x ′
X Population average proportion of laying workers
X∗ Evolutionarily stable strategy proportion of reproductive workers
w Population-wide proportion of males that are worker produced
q Fecundity of the queen in terms of male production relative to a single reproductive worker
S Survival of worker-laid eggs relative to queen-laid eggs (declines when they are selectively
killed)
P Effectiveness of policing (selective eating of worker eggs) p 1  S
R Life-for-life relatedness
Model in “Acquiescence to
Caste Fate”:
n Number of worker cells present at any one time
q Number of queen cells present at any one time
Wf Expected fitness of a female in a worker cell
Wn Expected fitness of each of the other n  1 females in worker cells
Wq Expected fitness of a normal queen developing from a queen cell
Wm Total number of males produced by the colony
y Probability with which a focal female in a worker cell develops as a queen
y ′ Probability with which each of the n  1 other females in worker cells develops as a queen
y¯ Colony average probability with which female larvae in worker cells develop as queensp (1 
n)y  [(n  1)/n]y ′
Y Population average probability of developing as a queen when in a worker cell
Y∗ Evolutionarily stable strategy probability of developing as a queen when in a worker cell
S Survival of small queens relative to normal queens (declines when they are selectively killed)
P Effectiveness of policing (selective elimination of queens developing in worker cells) p 1  S
Rf Life-for-life relatedness to sister queens reared in the colony
Rm Life-for-life relatedness to males reared in the colony
policed. Does this high policing effectiveness reduce the
incentive for workers to lay eggs, as several authors have
suggested (e.g., Ratnieks 1988; Visscher 1989; Ratnieks and
Reeve 1992)? For example, could it explain why so few
workers in queenright colonies (approximately 0.1%–
0.01%) have active ovaries (Ratnieks 1993)? If so, this
would be a good example of acquiescence.
The following model investigates whether effective po-
licing can cause acquiescence. Let n be the number of
workers in the colony, S the survival of worker-laid male
eggs relative to queen-laid male eggs (which is reduced by
both queen or worker policing but unaffected by random
egg mortality), and q the fecundity of the queen relative
to a single reproductive worker in terms of laying male
eggs. Assume that a focal worker in a colony activates her
ovaries to lay eggs with probability x and that each of its
nestmates activate their ovaries with probability x ′n 1
so that the colony contains egg-laying workers, where¯nx
is the average probability with which workers activatex¯
their ovaries, . We can now write′x¯p (1/n)x [(n 1)/n]x
the total number of males produced by this focal worker
and by each nestmate worker as
xS
¯W p G(x) # , (1)f ¯nxS q
′x S
¯W p G(x) # , (2)n ¯nxS q
where is the colony productivity (total number of¯G(x)
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males reared) as a function of how many laying workers
there are in the colony (egg-laying workers generally per-
form less work and so decrease total colony productivity;
Michener and Brothers 1974; Landolt et al. 1977; van
Honk and Hogeweg 1981; Ward 1983; Cole 1986; Hil-
lesheim et al. 1989; Reeve 1991; Monnin and Peeters 1999;
Hartmann and Heinze 2003). The following term repre-
sents the proportion of all males that are workers’ sons.
That is, the total number of sons of the focal and other
workers that survive policing (xS or x ′S), divided by all
surviving males, which includes both workers’ sons ( )¯nxS
and queen’s sons, laid in proportion to the relative rate q
at which these are produced. For simplicity, we will assume
that worker reproduction linearly reduces colony produc-
tivity, that is, .¯Gp 1 x
By a similar argument, the total number of males pro-
duced by the queen is
q
¯W p G(x) # . (3)mq nxS q
Finally, the total amount of female reproduction by the
colony (winged queens, or swarms for swarm-founding
species such as honeybees) is also a decreasing function
of . For simplicity, we assume that worker reproductionx¯
reduces queen and male production equally. Hence, the
total number of queens or swarms produced is
¯ ¯W p G(x)p 1 x. (4)q
To calculate the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) pro-
portion of workers who activate their ovaries we need to
calculate the inclusive fitness gained by a focal worker who
has a marginally greater probability of reproducing than
other workers. This can be calculated following Frank
(1998) as
W Wf n# R  (n 1) # # Rson nephewF F′ ′x xx,xrX x,xrX
W Wmq q # R  # R . (5)brother sisterF F′ ′x xx,xrX x,xrX
This is a Hamilton’s rule condition (Hamilton 1964) in
which the derivatives measure how greater reproduction
by the focal worker affects the production of various classes
of kin (sons of the focal worker, nephews produced by the
nestmate workers, and brothers and sisters producedn 1
by the mother queen; Frank 1998). The R values are the
life-for-life relatednesses to each class of offspring. The
derivatives are evaluated for the case where the workers’
behavior approaches that of the rest of the population,
( ), because we need to determine the invasion′x, x r X
condition for a mutant that is only marginally different
in phenotype from the common type (Frank 1998). Life-
for-life relatedness is the product of regression relatedness,
a measure of the proportion of genes the recipient has in
common with the actor relative to a random individual
and sex-specific reproductive value, a measure of the ge-
netic contribution of a given sex to the future gene pool
(Pamilo 1991). Hence, the R values can be expanded to
, , andR p r # n p 1 # n R p r # nson son m m nephew sister m
, where is the rela-R p r # n p (1/2) # n nbrother brother m m m
tive reproductive value of males to females, which is
, where is the population-wide proportion of1/(2 w) w
males that are workers’ sons (Pamilo 1991). In our case,
it can be seen that , where X is thewp nXS/(nXS q)
average proportion of laying workers in an average colony
in the population.
An evolutionarily stable strategy (Maynard Smith 1982)
occurs when there is no net inclusive fitness gain from
increased or decreased worker reproduction; that is, when
equation . Calculating the partial derivatives (see(5)p 0
the Mathematica notebook) and solving for X shows that
this occurs when the proportion of laying workers is
2B B  4AC
∗X p , (6)
2A
with
2 2Ap 2n S (1 R ),sister
Bp 2S[q(1 n R  4nR )sister sister
 (n 1)n(1 R )S],sister
Cp q[q(1 4R ) nS].sister
Because effective policing reduces the survival of
worker-laid eggs, we can substitute for S in the above1 P
equation, where P is the effectiveness of policing. The ESS
proportion of laying workers increases under three con-
ditions: first, with lower relatedness among sisters because
low sister-sister relatedness increases the relatedness gain
of replacing nephews by sons (cf. Bourke 1988); second,
with greater colony size because competition over male
production will then primarily be with other workers
rather than with the queen; third, with increasing male
egg production by the queen (the reverse argument). Im-
portantly, the ESS proportion of laying workers declines
as the effectiveness of the policing increases (fig. 2a). In-
tuitively, this is because the benefit to a worker of laying
( ) declines when fewer of her eggs are′W /xFx, x r Xf
reared. This supports the idea that policing of worker-laid
Figure 2: Acquiescence in the context of conflict over male parentage. a, Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) proportion of egg-laying workers (eq.
[6]) as a function of the relative probability P with which worker-laid eggs are killed (policed) relative to queen-laid eggs. The curves are drawn
for parameter values that apply to worker policing in the honeybee Apis mellifera (1, multiple mating, , workers, relative queenrp 0.3 np 35,000
fecundity ), the common wasp Vespula vulgaris (2, double mating, , workers, relative queen fecundity ), and theqp 25 rp 0.51 np 3,000 qp 25
European hornet Vespa crabro (3, mostly single mating, , workers, relative queen fecundity ), and to queen policing inrp 0.67 np 400 qp 2.5
Dolichovespula maculata (4, single mating, , workers, relative queen fecundity ). Note how the ESS declines as the efficiencyrp 0.75 np 180 qp 2.5
of policing approaches 100%. For example, for in honeybees and for in the hornet, it becomes unprofitable for any workerP 1 99.8% P 1 97.7%
to reproduce. This shows that policing can select for workers to completely refrain from egg laying. Parameter values are from Seeley (1985), Ratnieks
(1993), Foster and Ratnieks (2001a), Foster et al. (2002), and T. Wenseleers (unpublished data). b, Critical efficiency of policing required to favor
complete worker sterility as a function of sister-sister relatedness and for different n : q ratios (colony queen fecundity).size/relative
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eggs selects for self-policing or acquiescence (Ratnieks
1988; Visscher 1989).
If the effectiveness of policing is high enough, workers
are selected to completely refrain from egg laying. That is,
all workers acquiesce by showing complete reproductive
restraint. The conditions under which this should occur
can be determined by evaluating costs and benefits of
worker reproduction in a population where worker re-
production is absent, that is, . Substitution ofXp 0
in equation (5) shows that worker laying can onlyXp 0
invade when
S 1 1
# (R  R ) # R  # R 1 0. (7)son brother brother sisterq n n
This equation has the intuitive interpretation that a sin-
gle laying worker in a colony would replace a fraction S/
q of the queen’s male eggs by sons but would diminish
total colony reproduction by 1/n if it did no work. From
equation (7) it is clear that complete reproductive restraint
occurs when the survival of worker eggs is lower than
R  Rbrother sisterS pcrit (n/q)(R  R )son brother
1/4 R sisterp (8)
(n/q)(1/4)
1 4R sisterp
(n/q)
or when the effectiveness of policing P ( ) is greaterp 1 S
than . The critical policing effectiveness required1 Scrit
for complete worker acquiescence under different degrees
of relatedness among workers and for different n to q ratios
are shown in figure 2b.
Figure 2a illustrates numerically how policing reduces
the ESS proportion of egg-laying workers for parameter
values that apply to three well-characterized systems of
worker policing—the honeybee Apis mellifera (Ratnieks
and Visscher 1989), the common wasp Vespula vulgaris
(Foster and Ratnieks 2001a), and the European hornet
Vespa crabro (Foster et al. 2002)—and one system of queen
policing, in the wasp Dolichovespula maculata (Greene
1979). All four species have very low levels of worker
reproduction, with !2% of the workers having active ova-
ries (Ratnieks 1993; Foster and Ratnieks 2001a; Foster et
al. 2001, 2002). It is clear from our analysis that such low
levels of worker reproduction must be evolutionary re-
sponses to policing and not to kinship alone. Queens in
both the honeybee and the common wasp are polyandrous
(Palmer and Oldroyd 2000; Foster and Ratnieks 2001a),
which reduces relatedness among female offspring (Apis,
, Palmer and Oldroyd 2000; V. vulgaris, ,rp 0.3 rp 0.5
Foster and Ratnieks 2001a). The model predicts that with
such relatedness values and in the absence of policing, a
very high proportion of the workers should reproduce:
∼56% in Apis and ∼33% in Vespula. Similarly, the opti-
mum proportion of reproductive workers, in the absence
of policing, would be ∼19% in Vespa crabro and ∼14% in
Dolichovespula maculata (fig. 2a). The much smaller ob-
served proportion of reproductive workers in these species,
!2% (Ratnieks 1993; Foster and Ratnieks 2001b; Foster et
al. 2001, 2002), is probably a response to the effective
policing that occurs in these species (fig. 2a).
Acquiescence to Caste Fate
In social Hymenoptera, social policing can also occur in
other areas of reproduction besides male production, in-
cluding the conflict over female caste fate (Bourke and
Ratnieks 1999; Ratnieks 2001; Wenseleers et al. 2003). Ad-
vanced eusocial species are characterized by the presence
of a caste system in which immature females irreversibly
develop as one of two morphologically distinct castes,
queen or worker (Wilson 1971). Because queens have
much greater reproductive potential than workers, an im-
mature female generally benefits from developing as a
queen rather than as a worker (Bourke and Ratnieks 1999;
Ratnieks 2001; Reuter and Keller 2001; Strassmann et al.
2002; Wenseleers et al. 2003). However, her fate is normally
out of her own control, being socially imposed by the
amount or quality of food she is fed as a larva by the adult
workers (Wheeler 1986; Bourke and Ratnieks 1999; Beek-
man and Ratnieks 2003; Beekman et al. 2003). The pre-
vention of individuals from selfishly developing as queens
is referred to as caste-fate policing (Wenseleers et al. 2003).
But why should developing females accept the fate im-
posed on them and develop as workers in response to
reduced feeding? In several stingless bee genera, females
reared in worker cells overcome feeding control by de-
veloping as worker-sized “dwarf queens” (reviewed in En-
gels and Imperatriz-Fonseca 1990; Imperatriz-Fonseca and
Zucchi 1995; Wenseleers et al. 2003, 2005c). In this way,
they can successfully circumvent caste-fate policing. Sim-
ilarly, in many ant species, females can sometimes develop
as small intercaste queens (Heinze 1998). Given the im-
mature females in some species can overcome caste-fate
policing, why should females acquiesce to their imposed
feeding regime and not develop as dwarf queens in all
species?
One likely reason is that a dwarf queen may not get the
full reproductive benefit of a normal-sized queen. Indeed,
in the stingless bee Schwarziana quadripunctata, dwarf
queens are less fecund than normal queens (Ribeiro and
Alves 2001; Wenseleers et al. 2005c). If the lifetime fe-
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cundity of dwarf queens were less than 75% that of normal
queens, then under single mating and monandry, it is
better to develop into a worker than into a dwarf queen
because producing 100% of a full sister’s offspring (rp
) would be as good as producing 75% as many one’s0.375
own offspring ( ). This cost of becoming a dwarfrp 0.5
queen could select against cheating and favor females to
acquiesce to their intended worker fate.
An additional condition under which acquiescence may
be expected is when queens compete locally, as occurs in
species with swarm-founded colonies such as honeybees
and stingless bees. In swarm-founding species, queens
reared in worker cells would probably have a competitive
disadvantage over normal-sized queens, particularly if
workers prefer normal rather than undersized queens to
head new swarms or if dwarf queens have a reduced fight-
ing ability. Worker discrimination against dwarf queens
appears to occur in S. quadripunctata. Whereas large
queens are preferentially stored in special “queen prison”
cells, potentially to head a colony at a later date (Imper-
atriz-Fonseca and Kleinert-Giovannini 1989; Imperatriz-
Fonseca 1990), most dwarf queens are eliminated by the
workers (Imperatriz-Fonseca and Kleinert-Giovannini
1989; Imperatriz-Fonseca 1990; Wenseleers et al. 2005c).
Consequently, the proportion of dwarf queens heading
colonies (22%) is much lower than the rate at which they
are reared (86%, Wenseleers et al. 2005c).
Could discrimination against dwarf queens by workers
make developing as a dwarf queen less rewarding, similar
to the way that egg policing makes it less rewarding for
workers to lay eggs? To investigate this, consider the fol-
lowing model, which is an extension of a previous model
(Wenseleers et al. 2003).
Let n and q be the number of worker and queen cells
present at any one time in the colony and S be the survival
of dwarf queens reared in worker cells relative to normal
queens reared in queen cells (S declines when workers
selectively kill small queens). Assume that a focal female
in a worker cell cheats by developing into a dwarf queen
with probability y and that each of the females inn 1
worker cells cheat with an average probability of y ′. If
normal and small queens engage in a scramble competition
to form new swarms, then it can be shown (app. A) that
the ESS proportion of females in worker cells that should
develop as queens is
2B B  4AC
∗Y p , (9)
2A
with
2 2Ap n S (1 R ),m
Bp S{q[1 n 2nR  (1 n)R ]m f
 (n 1)n(1 R )S},f
Cp q[q(R  R ) n(1 R )S],m f f
where Rm and Rf are the (life-for-life) relatedness to males
and queens reared in the colony.
Plotting equation (9) shows that more females in worker
cells should develop as queens when either the relatedness
among sisters (Rf) or the relatedness to the males (Rm)
reared in the colony is lower (fig. 3). The presence of many
worker cells (high n) or few queen cells (low q) also height-
ens the conflict and favors more females in worker cells
to develop as queens. This is because it shifts the queen-
queen competition to being primarily among the females
developing in workers cells. However, as before, the pres-
ence of a policing mechanism, here in the form of the
selective elimination of small queens, can favor individuals
to acquiesce and deliberately accept their intended worker
fate.
If the probability that small queens are killed is suffi-
ciently high (i.e., if S is low or if P is high), then females
in worker cells can be selected to completely acquiesce and
never attempt to develop as a queen. As before, the con-
ditions under which this should occur can be determined
by calculating when females in worker cells are selected
to cheat and become queens in a situation in which the
strategy is initially absent. This is the case when
S 1 1
# (1 R ) # R  # R 1 0. (10)f f mq n n
Inequality equation (10) has the intuitive interpretation
that a single female that would develop as a queen rather
than a worker would win out over normal queens during
colony founding with probability S/q (because it would
survive with probability S but competes with q normal
queens) but that her loss to the workforce would reduce
the productivity of the colony (male and swarm produc-
tion) by a fraction 1/n. From equation (10), it is clear that
female larvae in worker cells are never selected to become
queens when the survival of dwarf queens is less than
R  Rm fS p (11)crit (n/q)(1 R )f
or when the effectiveness of policing P ( ) is greaterp 1 S
than . This critical efficiency of policing required1 Scrit
to favor complete caste-fate acquiescence, for different re-
latedness values and for different n : q ratios, is shown in
figure 3b.
Figure 3: Acquiescence in the context of conflict over caste fate in swarming social Hymenoptera such as stingless bees or honeybees. a, Evolutionarily
stable strategy (ESS) proportion of females in worker cells that should develop as queens (eq. [9]) reduces as the effectiveness of policing increases
(in the form of discrimination against dwarf queens reared in worker cells). The ESS is plotted for the situation of single mating ( ), as isR p 0.75f
typical for stingless bees (Peters et al. 1999), with all males being either queen’s sons ( ; top two curves) or workers’ sons ( ;R p 0.25 R p 0.75m m
bottom two curves) and with either 1 : 1,000 (solid lines) or 1 : 100 (dashed lines) cells being specialized queen cells (number of worker cells np
or 1,000 for every queen cell that is built). b, Critical effectiveness of policing required to make it completely unprofitable for females in worker100
cells to develop as queens, plotted as a function of sister-sister relatedness, with all males being either queen’s sons ( ; top solid and dashedR p 0.25m
curves) or workers’ sons ( ; bottom solid and dashed curves) and with either 1 : 1,000 (solid lines) or 1 : 100 (dashed lines) cells beingR p 0.75m
specialized queen cells.
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Support for these predictions is provided by patterns of
queen production in different genera of stingless bees. In
the genus Melipona, normal-sized queens reared from spe-
cialized queen cells are absent ( ). Instead, all queensqp 0
and workers (and males) develop in identically sized cells
on a similarly sized provision mass (Engels and Imperatriz-
Fonseca 1990; Wenseleers et al. 2004). Furthermore, caste-
fate policing is impossible ( ) as queen developmentPp 0
is unconstrained by nutrition (Kerr 1950; Wenseleers et
al. 2003, 2004, 2005c). In line with prediction, a very large
proportion, 5%–14%, of Melipona females selfishly de-
velop into queens (Kerr 1950; Wenseleers and Ratnieks
2004). By contrast, in stingless bees where queens are nor-
mally reared from larger royal cells, few or zero females
in worker cells develop as queens (Engels and Imperatriz-
Fonseca 1990; Imperatriz-Fonseca and Zucchi 1995; Ri-
beiro et al. 2003). For example, in S. quadripunctata, just
0.6% of all females in worker cells become dwarf queens
(Wenseleers et al. 2005c). This is as predicted given that
dwarf queens are less fecund (Ribeiro and Alves 2001;
Wenseleers et al. 2005c) and that as a result of selective
culling by workers (fig. 1), their survival S is only
that of normal(0.22/0.86)[(1 0.86)/(1 0.22)]p 4.6%
queens (cf. Ribeiro and Alves 2001; Wenseleers et al. 2005c;
and data cited above). Fecundity costs are probably also
the reason why the honeybee females in worker cells never
develop as small queens: the fecundity of such queens
would almost certainly be too low to sustain their large
colonies of over 35,000 bees (Seeley 1985; Winston 1987).
In addition, and unlike in stingless bees, larvae are reared
in open cells in the honeybee (Winston 1987), which
would enable workers to kill larvae attempting to develop
into queens at an early age.
Discussion
Social policing is a key mechanism for reducing conflict
and promoting cooperation within social groups (Rat-
nieks 1988, 2000; Ratnieks and Visscher 1989; Ratnieks
and Reeve 1992; Frank 1995, 1996; Bourke and Ratnieks
1999; Monnin and Ratnieks 2001). However, our analysis
shows that policing may be far more effective at reducing
conflict than previously realized. Not only can policing
prevent individuals from acting selfishly, it can also make
it worthless for them even to try to act selfishly in the
first place. This can favor societies where most individuals
acquiesce by adopting a less-favored position or strategy
in society. We examined two major conflict scenarios
found in the eusocial Hymenoptera, and in both cases,
effective policing can make resistance largely or com-
pletely useless. This is a very significant finding because
it helps to resolve major long-standing issues at the heart
of eusociality: the evolution and maintenance of repro-
ductive division of labor, in particular why most workers
who retain ovaries do not use them and why most to-
tipotent female larvae develop into workers and not
queens (Darwin 1859; Hamilton 1964; Trivers and Hare
1976). Empirically, acquiescence can explain the observed
low levels of reproductive workers found in insect so-
cieties with effective policing, such as the honeybee (Rat-
nieks 1993) or the common wasp (Foster and Ratnieks
2001a), and the rarity by which females cheat on their
intended worker fate, which only occurs at low levels in
a minority of genera (e.g., in some stingless bees; Engels
and Imperatriz-Fonseca 1990; Imperatriz-Fonseca and
Zucchi 1995; Ribeiro and Alves 2001; Wenseleers et al.
2003; Wenseleers et al. 2005c) and is entirely absent in
most (e.g., in the honeybee; Winston 1987). The ultimate
endpoint of acquiescence is the evolution of obligate
worker sterility in some species, for example, in Atta,
where workers are unable to lay viable eggs (M. Dijkstra,
personal communication) and in Linepithema, Mono-
morium, Pheidole, and Solenopsis ants and Frieseomellitta
and Duckeola stingless bees, where workers have evolu-
tionarily lost ovaries altogether (Oster and Wilson 1978;
Cruz-Landim 2000). However, because it is currently un-
known whether these genera ancestrally had queen or
worker policing, we cannot test whether worker sterility
has indeed evolved in response to policing or whether
alternative factors may have been the main cause.
Given the large and complex societies found in many
eusocial Hymenoptera, it it perhaps unsurprising that
they should provide such clear examples of acquiescence.
Nevertheless, acquiescence may also be expected in other
social situations such as in vertebrate societies (Emlen
1991; Keller and Reeve 1994) or in the parent-offspring
relationship (Mock and Parker 1998). For example, if
parents do not respond to excessive levels of begging,
this would favor more obedient, acquiescent young
(Mock and Parker 1998). Similarly, in cooperatively
breeding animals, manipulation by dominants can im-
pose costs on subordinates, favoring them to stay and
help rather than leave, that is, acquiesce (Crespi and
Ragsdale 2000). These examples indicate that acquies-
cence could well be a very widespread mechanism for
conflict reduction in societies.
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APPENDIX A
Derivation of the ESS Production of Cheating Queens
Let n and q be the number of worker and queen cells
present at any one time in the colony and S be the survival
of dwarf queens reared in worker cells relative to normal
queens reared in queen cells (dwarf queen survival declines
when workers discriminate against them). Assume that a
focal female in a worker cell develops as a queen rather
than as a worker with probability y versus probability y ′
for the other females. The colony will then, at anyn 1
one time, produce normal queens from queen cells at a
rate proportional to q and small queens from worker cells
at a rate proportional to , if is the average probability¯ ¯ny y
with which females in worker cells develop as queens,
. Also assume, for simplicity,′y¯p (1/n)y [(n 1)/n]y
that small queens reared from worker cells do not have
reduced fecundity relative to normal queens (including
fecundity in the model greatly complicates the analysis
because it would be necessary to keep track of the pro-
portions of colonies in the population that are headed by
small vs. normal queens).
The probability that queens reared in worker cells will
successfully head a new colony is proportional to
yS
¯W p G(y) # (A1)f ¯nyS q
and
′y S
¯W p G(y) # , (A2)n ¯nyS q
where is the colony productivity (relative number of¯G(y)
new swarms formed) as a function of how many females
become queens rather than workers. The term following
this represents the proportion of all new queens who were
reared in worker cells, which is given by the probability
that each one develops as a queen (probability y or y ′)
and survives (probability S) divided by the total number
of surviving small queens ( ) plus the number of normal¯nyS
queens (q) produced. For simplicity, we will assume that
colony productivity declines linearly with the proportion
of females that develop into queens rather than workers,
. Note that these equations have the same form¯Gp 1 y
as in the worker reproduction model (see “Worker Sterility
as Acquiescence”) but with the parameters suitably
redefined.
By a similar argument, the expected fitness of queens
reared in queen cells is proportional to
1
¯W p G(y) # . (A3)q ¯nyS q
Finally, fitness through male production Wm is also a
decreasing function of :y¯
W p G(y)p 1 y. (A4)m
To calculate the ESS, we need to calculate the inclusive
fitness gained by females in worker cells who alter their
probability of developing as a queen, which can be cal-
culated as (Frank 1998)
W Wf n# R  (n 1) # # Rself sisterF F′ ′y yy,yrY y,yrY
W Wq m q # # R  # R . (A5)sister malesF F′ ′y yy,yrY y,yrY
As in “Worker Sterility as Acquiescence,” this is a Ham-
ilton’s rule condition (Hamilton 1964) in which the de-
rivatives measure how the behavior of the focal female in
a worker cell affects the fitness or production of various
classes of kin (self, sister females in other workern 1
cells, sister queens in q queen cells, and males produced
by either the queen or the workers), and the R values
measure the life-for-life relatednesses to each of them. Cal-
culating the partial derivatives and solving when the re-
sulting equation is 0 yields the ESS given in equation (9)
(see the Mathematica notebook and code).
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